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I. Introduction
The Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies (IMES) of the Bank of Japan (BOJ)
held its 2009 International Conference, entitled “Financial System and Monetary Pol-
icy Implementation,” on May 27 and 28, 2009, at the Bank of Japan Head Ofﬁce in
Tokyo.
1 The conference explored a wide range of ﬁnancial and prudential issues and
their implications for monetary policy, including counterparty risk in interbank markets,
market liquidity in bond markets, and capital adequacy regulation and procyclicality
in ﬁnancial systems. Some 100 distinguished guests from academia, international
organizations, and central banks attended the conference.
2
The conference began with opening remarks by the Governor of the BOJ, Masaaki
Shirakawa, followed by keynote speeches by the two honorary advisers of IMES,
Bennett T. McCallum (Carnegie Mellon University) and Maurice Obstfeld (Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley). The six subsequent sessions each consisted of a
paper presentation and two designated discussions, followed by ﬂoor discussions. The
conference concluded with a policy panel discussion.
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In the opening remarks,
3 Shirakawa began by arguing that interactions between ﬁ-
nancial system and monetary policy had posed important policy challenges to the
BOJ since the late 1980s, when the bubble emerged, and recollected that a long and
winding evolution had been taking place in the way of thinking of monetary policy
management occurring since that time. He pointed out striking similarities between
policy measures formerly taken by the BOJ after the bursting of the bubble and those
recently taken by central banks in the major economies. He argued that liquidity was
the most important concept in understanding the recent ﬁnancial crisis and that the
principal role for central banks had been and would continue to be to serve as guardians
of liquidity. Finally, he touched on speciﬁc issues and challenges for central banks, in-
cluding the implementation of unconventional policy measures and risk-taking channel
of monetary policy.
In the ﬁrst keynote speech,
4 McCallum remarked on the crucial role of learnability
in monetary policy analysis. To form expectations rationally, he said, individual agents
needed to learn the dynamic properties of the system based on observed data. Showing
some cases in which determinacy did not relate to stable and learnable solutions, he
pointed out that determinacy was neither necessary nor sufﬁcient for making a single
rational expectations solution plausible. The role of determinacy, he argued, needed to
be reconsidered and substantially deemphasized or replaced.
In a second keynote speech,
5 Obstfeld ﬁrst pointed out the importance of a global
and systemic perspective on ﬁnancial stability in light of the growing importance as-
sumed by emerging economies in the global economy in recent years. In the recent
ﬁnancial crisis, he described the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) as an international lender
of last resort in U.S. dollar funding through its extension of currency swap lines with
foreign central banks. Nevertheless, he argued, greater institutionalization of inter-
national coordination was required than in the past. He concluded that the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) could play the role of an international lender of last resort by
establishing access to individual central bank credit lines, while pointing to remaining
problems such as moral hazard.
III. Paper Presentation Session
A. Liquidity, Business Cycles, and Monetary Policy
6
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki (Princeton University) presented a model of monetary economy
comprised of assets with different liquidity levels: capital, equity, and money. In the
model he presented, equity was less liquid than money as entrepreneurs were unable to
immediately sell all the equity holdings. Entrepreneurs faced the borrowing constraint
as they were able to ﬁnance only a fraction of their investment by issuing new equities.
3. For details, see Shirakawa (2009).
4. For details, see McCallum (2009).
5. For details, see Obstfeld (2009).
6. For details, see Kiyotaki and Moore (2009).
2 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/NOVEMBER 2009Financial System and Monetary Policy Implementation
At equilibrium, entrepreneurs held money, even though returns from holding money
were lower than from non-monetary assets (liquidity premium). Once non-monetary
assets became less liquid exogenously in the asset market, he noted, aggregate invest-
ment fell, as the liquidity constraint for investment expenditures tightened. In such
an environment, he argued, open market operations that made it possible to purchase
equity by issuing money might alleviate liquidity shocks, since money outperformed
other assets in terms of liquidity and mitigated the turmoil arising from the sudden loss
of liquidity of non-monetary assets.
In his comments, Zheng Liu (Fed San Francisco) argued for the essential nature of
studying the quantitative importance of liquidity constraints. He also emphasized that
conventional monetary policy, to exchange money for bonds, was neutral to the econ-
omy in the model. Second discussant Marianne Nessén (Sveriges Riksbank) pointed
out that market operations could result in the tax distortions associated with govern-
ment losses and demanded full-scale welfare analysis of this issue. She also argued that
workers in the model had only constrained access to the ﬁnancial markets and predicted
that more unconstrained access to ﬁnancial markets might lead to different results.
From the ﬂoor, adding to Liu’s comments, David Altig (Fed Atlanta) asked if the
model implied that quantitative easing was useless while credit easing was effective. In
response, Kiyotaki said that open market operations would be more effective if they
removed illiquid assets from the private sector, rather than merely changing the compo-
sition of liquid assets such as money and bonds. Voicing agreement with Nessén, Frank
Smets (European Central Bank [ECB]) and Paul Tucker (Bank of England [BOE])
pointed out that open market operations described in the model were not really repos
but outright purchases of risky assets. Smets asked whether the use of repo transactions
would have similar beneﬁcial effects. Tucker argued that the liquidity merits had to
be weighed against the risk of credit losses. In reply, Kiyotaki maintained that illiquid
assets earned higher expected returns than money due to the liquidity premium and
that government on average stood to gain from market operations. He said, in response
to Nessén, that if workers were involved in investment opportunities such as housing
investment with borrowing constraints, they resembled entrepreneurs within the model.
He admitted that welfare analysis was necessary, but the assumption of heterogeneous
agents made such analysis difﬁcult. Marvin Goodfriend (Carnegie Mellon University)
pointed out that the subject of the model was not narrow liquidity but broad liquidity
and cast doubt on whether a central bank had the leeway to increase broad liquidity by
adding reserves.
B. Segmentation in the U.S. Dollar Money Markets during the Financial Crisis
7
JamesJ.McAndrews(FedNewYork)analyzedtheintegrationofovernightEurodollar
and federal funds (FF) markets, which were well integrated in normal times. Drawing
on transaction-level data for Eurodollar and FF loans, as well as the LIBOR panel of
overnight interest rates, he found evidence for signiﬁcant rate differences between the
two market segments during the ﬁnancial crisis from August 2007. He pointed out
that the foreign exchange swap program between central banks signiﬁcantly reduced
7. For details, see McAndrews (2009).
3the spread between the LIBOR and FF rates, proposing that segmentation in the two
markets resulted from (1) the absence of reserve requirements for dollars outside the
United States, (2) time zone differences, and (3) different counterparties in different
geographic areas.
As reasons for differences in the spreads, Katrin Assenmacher (Swiss National
Bank) pointed out deviations between quoted rates and effective rates, differences in
creditworthiness, and mismatches in time zones. She suggested comparing LIBOR with
the Asian Eurodollar rates. Working from intraday data, Shin-ichi Fukuda (University
of Tokyo) pointed out that even within the FF market in New York, large divergences
emerged during the crisis.
From the ﬂoor, in line with Assenmacher’s discussion, Hans Genberg (Hong
Kong Monetary Authority), Smets, Javier Suarez (Centro de Estudios Monetarios y
Financieros), and Tucker raised questions about the effects of differences in counter-
party risk on the regression results. For example, Genberg asked if counterparty risk
induced deviations from covered interest parity. Tucker pointed out that banks with-
out a presence in the United States might have been rationed by U.S. resident lenders
due to perceptions of counterparty risk, arguing that reﬂected not counterparty risk
but asymmetric information. In response, McAndrews maintained that policy mea-
sures for interbank markets, including the foreign exchange swap program, needed
to be assessed with consideration on their impacts on counterparty risk. In response
to Fukuda’s comment, McAndrews acknowledged large intraday divergences within
the FF market, even within the same time zone and geographical jurisdiction. In re-
sponse to the suggestion by Smets to examine the time of day, McAndrews noted
data constraints of seeing the time of settlement, rather than the time of the actual
trade, resulting in the long delays between settlement and the trade times. In relation
to the dollar swaps program, Genberg and Obstfeld emphasized the effects of market
turbulence on exchange rates. Obstfeld asked if the result in the paper was affected
by the perception that U.S. banks ultimately had access to a well-deﬁned lender of last
resort in dollars. Expanding on Obstfeld’s keynote speech, Grant Spencer (Reserve
Bank of New Zealand) emphasized the importance of a global approach to the lender
of last resort.
C. A Financial System Perspective on Japan’s Experience in the Late 1980s
8
Hyun Song Shin (Princeton University) revisited Japan’s experiences in the late 1980s
in light of lessons learned from the U.S. subprime crisis. He focused on the fact that
large manufacturers became net creditors from net debtors, thereby becoming part of
the ﬁnancial intermediation sector. The Japanese large ﬁrms raised funds by issuing
securities and supplied that new money to the banking sector in the form of newly intro-
duced time deposits with liberalized interest rates. When good borrowers already had
credit, easy monetary conditions that promoted greater credit supply increased credit
availability to marginal borrowers, especially real estate-related ﬁrms.
As the ﬁrst discussant, Spencer expressed his views on the main drivers of
credit supply: new injection of funds into the banking system, a shift in funds from
8. For details, see Hattori, Shin, and Takahashi (2009).
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lower-leveraged ﬁnancial institutions to higher-leveraged ones, and banks’ market
share strategies in booms. Second discussant Tsutomu Watanabe (Hitotsubashi Uni-
versity) pointed out that the prime holders of securities issued by nonﬁnancial ﬁrms
were foreigners in the Flow of Funds Statistics. He also argued that the purchase by
foreigners of securities issued by governments had declined in the late 1980s, a change
attributable to government efforts to pare public debt.
Addressing the issue of macroprudential policy from the ﬂoor, Kiyohiko G.
Nishimura (BOJ) asked about implications of a leverage ratio cap. Shin replied that
it was needed to consider a way of siphoning off excess capital. He proposed a Pigo-
vian tax to the equity by gauging the spillover effects on the ﬁnancial system. Adding
to Spencer’s comments, Christopher Kent (Reserve Bank of Australia) pointed out the
role of competitive pressures as a driving force, sparked by ﬁnancial deregulation and
innovation. In response, Wataru Takahashi (BOJ) noted that the market share strat-
egy explanation was somewhat outdated and applied to Japanese banks in the 1960s
and the 1970s, but admitted they had not changed dramatically, even under conditions
of ﬁnancial liberalization. In response to Watanabe’s comment, Masazumi Hattori
(BOJ) pointed out that when foreign subsidiaries of Japanese nonﬁnancial ﬁrms pur-
chased bonds issued by Japanese ﬁrms, the Flow of Funds Statistics categorized such
transaction as undertaken by foreign entities. Goodfriend, John Murray (BOC), and
Shigenori Shiratsuka (BOJ) from the ﬂoor pointed to the political economy of regu-
lation and uneven ﬁnancial liberalization as a major factor underlying excessive risk-
taking at that time. Prompted by these remarks, McCallum acknowledged political
pressures upon Japan to implement an expansionary monetary and ﬁscal policy. Akira
Ariyoshi (IMF) and Assenmacher pointed to the heavy involvement by subsidiaries of
Japanese banks in lending to sectors related to real estate. Donald L. Kohn (Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) asked why ﬁnal investors, including
foreigners, were willing to take more risks when leverage increased.
D. The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation
9
Suarez examined the procyclical effects of bank capital regulation on credit supply,
proposing a tractable dynamic equilibrium model of relationship lending, thereby eval-
uating the effects of the minimum capital requirements under Basel I and II. He ex-
plained that in the model banks anticipated that shocks to their earnings as well as the
cyclical position of the economy would impair their capacity to lend in the future and
thus retained precautionary capital buffers. He presented various quantitative arguments
that, despite larger precautionary buffers, contractions in bank credit on the arrival of
a recession were greater under risk-sensitive capital requirements (Basel II) than under
risk-insensitive ones (Basel I). He also showed that small cyclical adjustments in con-
ﬁdence levels would signiﬁcantly reduce procyclical effects on credit supply without
compromising long-run solvency targets for banks.
In his comments, Haibin Zhu (Bank for International Settlements [BIS]) pointed
out the importance and difﬁculty, when designing a framework for contingent cap-
ital requirements, of constructing indicators for banking distress and linking such
9. For details, see Repullo and Suarez (2009).
5indicators to minimum capital requirements. For future extension, he proposed ac-
counting for the possibility that Basel II improved bank capacity in risk measurements
and risk pricing, potentially reducing procyclical effects considered in the paper. In his
comments, Kent pointed out that there might be other ways to extend this modeling
framework so as to reduce the procyclicality of effects on credit supply. In particular,
referring to Australian experiences with two different types of economic depressions in
the 1890s and the 1930s, he argued for enriching the way the risk evolved through the
business cycle, including via a role for asset price and credit market developments.
Genberg, Goodfriend,a n dSpencer cast doubts on the feasibility of implement-
ing macroprudential measures, including setting optimal countercyclical capital reg-
ulations. For example, Goodfriend argued that discretionary countercyclical capital
regulations were more difﬁcult than inﬂation targeting because the former required
more accurate assessments of productivity shocks. Spencer questioned how macro-
prudential measures handled asymmetry; in particular, dampening a boom in which
banks hoarded capital. Admitting practical difﬁculties, Jaime Caruana (BIS) sup-
ported Suarez’s attempt, arguing that policymakers needed to ﬁnd a balance to avoid
slipping back to a risk-insensitive system. Suarez replied that the model had yet to
provide a full answer to policy implementation, but would serve as a toolkit allow-
ing economists and central bank ofﬁcials to check their favorite adjustments for pro-
cyclicality. To address the risk sensitivity of capital requirements, he mentioned a
possible extension to incorporate heterogeneity into the risk of investment projects.
Responding to Kent’s comment, Suarez noted that it was possible to analyze the
model with a richer stochastic process for aggregate shocks. Murray suggested incor-
porating macroprudential considerations to recognize the real economic consequences
of procyclicality.
E. Credit Risk and the Macroeconomy: Evidence from an Estimated
DSGE Model
10
Simon Gilchrist (Boston University) constructed a corporate credit spread with
medium risk but long maturity, ranging from 1973 to 2008, based on the estimated
distribution of ﬁrm-speciﬁc distance-to-defaults, comparing its predictive content for
economic activity with that of other standard ﬁnancial indicators. He then estimated a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with the ﬁnancial accelerator
mechanism using the credit spreads and demonstrated that medium-risk, long-maturity
credit spreads offered signiﬁcant predictive power for real economic variables, sug-
gesting important links between ﬁnancial conditions and macroeconomic outcomes.
Based on projections from a DSGE model, he pointed out that a signiﬁcant fraction of
cyclical ﬂuctuations in output and investment over the period from 1973 to 2008 were
attributable to disturbances originating in the ﬁnancial sector.
In his comments, Todd Clark (Fed Kansas City) suggested the rigorous evaluation
of spreads obtained in the paper, comparing this to other ﬁnancial indices, examining
data stability, and checking the performance of out-of-sample forecasting. He added
that the paper needed to clarify the beneﬁt of including those spreads for the DSGE
10. For details, see Gilchrist, Ortiz, and Zakrajsek (2009).
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model estimation, asking if their ﬁnancial shock affected only investment. Presenting
quantitative examples, Tomoyuki Nakajima (Kyoto University) pointed out that the
approach used in the paper—using a linearized model to account for risk premiums and
assetprices by adding an exogenous risk premium shock to the Euler equation—yielded
a biased estimation result.
From the ﬂoor, Nishimura voiced agreement with Nakajima, asking if linear ap-
proximation was appropriate for an environment in which GDP contracted for two
consecutive quarters by more than 10 percent on an annualized basis. Gilchrist ad-
mitted the model featured two nonlinearities stemming from the ﬁnancial contract
and the risk premium and conceded the importance of analyzing their interactions. In
his response to Clark’s comments, Gilchrist argued that despite cases in which ad-
verse ﬁnancial shock caused negative co-movement of consumption and investment,
the sign of the correlation depended on the speciﬁcation of monetary policy rules.
Ippei Fujiwara (BOJ) and Liu, respectively, questioned the validity of the identiﬁ-
cation of ﬁnancial shocks and an intertemporal shock. Smets suggested that the author
could generate artiﬁcial data using the estimated shocks to check whether the model
could capture the lead-lag relationships between premium and output. Shin suggested
considering quantities as well as premiums.
F. Central Banking in the Credit Turmoil: An Assessment of the Fed’s Practice
11
Goodfriend presented a framework for reconsidering central banking in light of the
extraordinary circumstances that resulted from the ﬁnancial turmoil, classifying core
central banking initiatives as monetary policy, credit policy, and interest rate policy,
and emphasizing the importance of the threefold taxonomy under current circum-
stances. Based on a ﬁscal perspective, he argued that, under the zero bound of nominal
interest rates, monetary policy required more support from ﬁscal authorities than was
usually granted. He also pointed out that since a central bank’s credit policy amounted
to ﬁscal policy, central bank independence was incompatible over time with all but
limited, temporary last resort lending to depository institutions, and argued that a cen-
tral bank needed to maintain a distance from credit policy to the full extent possible.
Finally, drawing on a study of the 1951 Fed-Treasury Accord on Monetary Policy, he
provided six principles as the basis for a comprehensive credit policy.
In his comments, Smets questioned whether the framework in the paper was the
best way to describe monetary policy implementation in countries other than the United
States. He also suggested distinguishing between credit policy and liquidity manage-
ment in unconventional policy measures using the central bank balance sheet. Hiroshi
Ugai (BOJ) questioned the perspective wherein, at the zero bound of nominal interest
rates, an increase on the liability side of the central bank balance sheet effectively
stimulated the economy, reviewing Japan’s experiences with quantitative easing policy
in 2001–06. A central bank needed to proceed with credit policy as one of important
monetary policy tools based on its own decisions and on its own responsibility, he
argued, while maintaining its cautious stance against stepping further into the area of
ﬁscal policy.
11. For details, see Goodfriend (2009).
7From the ﬂoor, Shiratsuka pointed out, in line with Smets’ discussion, the nature
of monetary policy in normal times differed from the nature of liquidity management
in times of crisis. Kohn suggested that the importance of liquidity should not be under-
estimated. In response, Goodfriend noted that he avoided using “liquidity” because
the term was poorly understood. In response to Ugai’s questions, he also maintained
that the effectiveness of a certain action on expanding the central bank balance sheet
depended crucially on the credibility of the central bank action. Shin argued that direct
intervention to ﬁnancial intermediation would be more effective in reducing premiums
intheﬁnancialmarketsthanexpandingexcessreservesandpurchasingcorporatebonds.
Kent suggested discussing frameworks in place at other central banks, particularly
regarding interest payment on reserves. In response, Goodfriend said that he hoped
to examine his framework from an international perspective. Regarding ﬁscal policy,
McAndrews and Shirakawa emphasized that the paper needed to clearly deﬁne ﬁscal
policy, given ﬁscal policy’s strong implications for the credibility of central banks.
Tucker argued that the paper needed to consider policies and principles from the
perspective of a ﬁscal authority. In response, Goodfriend noted that central banks
needed to address political issues associated with unconventional monetary policy in
times of ﬁnancial crisis. In his comments, McCallum remarked that a clear taxon-
omy stemmed ultimately from the understanding of money—for example, if the paper
took the position that a central bank was basically a monetary authority rather than
a ﬁscal authority.
IV. Policy Panel Discussion
In the panel discussion chaired by Kazuo Ueda (University of Tokyo), Hiroshi Nakaso
(BOJ), Kohn, Tucker, and Caruana stated their views on recent policy measures in
response to the global ﬁnancial turmoil.
A. Panelist Speeches
Nakaso began by reviewing unconventional policy measures taken by four major cen-
tral banks, the BOJ, the Fed, the BOE, and the ECB. He said that unconventional
policies had been introduced when the policy rate had been brought to an effective
lower bound and conventional policy instruments had been more or less exhausted.
He then offered his typology of unconventional policy measures by a central bank:
pure credit easing was the assumption of credit risk on the central bank balance sheet
without creating excess reserves, while pure quantitative easing was the creation of
excess reserves without assuming credit risk—for example, through the purchase of
government securities. In reality, he said, combined policies of credit and quantitative
easing, which involved large-scale liquidity injection as well as extending credits to
targeted dysfunctional markets, had been implemented. He pointed out, as a result, bal-
ance sheets of the four central banks had expanded, generating signiﬁcant downward
pressure on money market rates. He added that a general consensus appeared to exist
among central banks to keep money market rates at positive levels, thereby minimizing
the negative side effects—for example, the contraction of the money market.
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He also offered several interim assessments of the effectiveness of certain un-
conventional measures, focusing on policies implemented by the BOJ. He claimed
that U.S. dollar funds-supplying operations had sharply reduced OIS-LIBOR spreads
under conditions in which the currency swap market had broken down after the
Lehman Brothers failure. With respect to unconventional measures for dysfunctional
credit markets, presenting regression results, he reported that Special Funds-Supplying
Operations to Facilitate Corporate Financing, ﬁxed-rate full-allotment liquidity provi-
sions with eligible corporate debt as collateral, in combination with CP repo operations
and CP outright purchases, had reduced CP-OIS spreads.
Finally, he remarked that each central bank had purchased government bonds but
that their rationales or announced objectives differed. He concluded that reading the
market reaction was not a straightforward activity and that the long-term effects of such
outright purchases needed to be monitored.
Kohn pointed out that one aspect of the current crisis was the severe adverse ef-
fects on both securities markets and ﬁnancial intermediaries, attributable to their tight
interconnections. He emphasized feedback loop mechanisms between ﬁnancial inter-
mediation and nonﬁnancial spending, which ampliﬁed ﬁnancial disruptions, especially
decreased funding liquidity and market liquidity. Given such issues, he argued, merely
lowering the FF rate was insufﬁcient, since such rate reductions did not trickle down to
the broader markets. The Fed needed to step into credit policy, so-called credit easing,
he argued, to intervene directly in dysfunctional markets.
In an exit strategy, he argued, a central bank needed to ﬁght a war on two fronts:
the risk of deﬂation in the near term and the risk of inﬂation over the long term. He
also noted the importance of convincing the public that a central bank had a framework
for an exit strategy and the will to implement this when the time came. He pointed to
encouraging signs within the United States that the administration recognized the value
of an independent monetary authority and argued that this provided the Fed with an
additional tool to tighten policy when needed.
With regard to what the Fed would do after an exit, he pointed out that the Fed was
all the more aware of the fragility and complexity of the ﬁnancial intermediation pro-
cess and the interactions of the ﬁnancial sector with the real economy. He then raised
two points. First, he demanded that central bank economists include more highly devel-
oped credit sectorsin monetary policy analysis. Second, he calledfor liquidity facilities,
even after the crisis had passed, to maintain stability under ordinary circumstances. He
then addressed the role of asset prices in monetary policy, expressing agreement with
Shirakawa concerning the need to extend the forecast horizon, but maintaining that he
remained undecided whether, if a bubble element were seen in asset prices potentially
affecting output and inﬂation, a central bank would tighten monetary conditions and
sacriﬁce its macroeconomic objectives. As his ﬁrst choice, he speciﬁed more effective
ﬁnancial supervision and regulation to combat an asset price bubble.
Finally, regarding an inﬂation objective, he expressed discomfort with the idea of
raising the numerical deﬁnition of the inﬂation objective even temporarily, given the
difﬁculty of controlling expectations.
9Tucker focused on three types of last resort policies in times of ﬁnancial crisis:
lender of last resort, market maker of last resort, and capital of last resort.
12 Of the three,
he noted, the ﬁrst had been discussed extensively and was well understood, but the
remaining two were less understood and required innovation.
First, he stated that the BOE acted as the lender of last resort by balancing the
provision of liquidity insurance against the cost of creating incentives for banks to take
greater risks. He provided ﬁve principles for their facilities: (1) to avoid conﬂicts with
monetary policy, and ideally to support it; (2) to hold adequate collateral; (3) to provide
liquiditywithlongermaturitiesthanovernightoraweek;(4)touseloans,eitherreposor
swaps, rather than outright purchases; and (5) to provide only to commercial banks via
permanent facilities. He added that liquidity insurance facilities needed to be provided
with banks, in the judgment of the BOE, free of serious questions regarding solvency.
Second, he described the role of market maker of last resort as an uncharted terri-
tory for a central bank, reﬂecting an advance in market-based ﬁnancial intermediation.
He suggested that a central bank needed to have the capability to support liquidity in
capital markets, taking as an example of the BOE’s facilities to provide a backstop bid
for CPs and corporate bonds. He then gave ﬁve principles for this role: (1) to support
monetary policy; (2) to impose penalties; (3) to use an auction mechanism; (4) to limit
the exposures to the central bank’s capital resources; and (5) to avoid supplanting the
market under normal circumstances.
Third and ﬁnally, he discussed capital of last resort, stating that, however rarely, the
ﬁscal authority was by many expected in practice to provide such a role drawing on its
risk-taking capacity. He argued that the threshold for injecting capital could be deter-
mined in coordination with a central bank and regulatory authority. Addressing moral
hazard, he suggested transferring any risks back to the banking sector. For example, he
pointed out that any losses suffered by the ﬁscal authority would have to be covered
by the surviving banking system. He emphasized that any such capital of last resort
policy would desirably adhere to principles to be mapped out before successors faced
a future crisis.
Caruana discussed monetary policy lessons learned from the current crisis in re-
lation to ﬁnancial stability, underscoring three points: our limited knowledge of the
economy and the ﬁnancial system as well as their interactions; limited incentives, rather
than knowledge, for market self-correction mechanisms; and the extraordinary cost of
the current systemic crisis.
Given the above lessons, he claimed, policymakers needed to be more responsive
to the build-up of ﬁnancial imbalances, not just to clean-up efforts when adverse
impacts emerged. In particular, he emphasized that prudential policy needed to in-
corporate a more pronounced macroeconomic viewpoint. To assess systemic risks and
procyclicality, he conceded, requirements included early warning systems, a better
architecture for a system of cooperation, and better market infrastructures. And yet,
he argued, strengthening all these areas still would not sufﬁce. Macroeconomic policy
should not only be used to deal with the aftermath of the collapse of an asset price
bubble. To demonstrate the need for macroeconomic policy also to help lean against
12. For details, see Tucker (2009).
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the build-up of excessive risk, he provided the example of Spain around 1999. The
Spanish economy had been experiencing a housing boom when interest rates declined
dramatically, due to accession to the euro system. Interest rates, determined by the
ECB, were below what Spain needed in terms of economic conditions. Therefore, on
prudential grounds, the Spanish policymakers chose to introduce a new framework for
loan provisions, taking 20 percent of operating proﬁts for an initial couple of years.
This policy, he contended, had successfully constrained credit risks and created better
buffers, although this policy had not restrained credit growth signiﬁcantly. This pointed
to the need for coordination with monetary policy.
Finally, he suggested that monetary policy needed to consider a risk-taking channel
that encouraged risk appetite under low interest rates, particularly when maintained for
extended periods. He pointed to the advantages of not treating asset prices as exogenous
when they, in fact, were inherently inﬂuenced by the policy stance, since they had a
considerable inﬂuence on credit cycles, even though central banks would face the trade-
off between ﬁnancial stability and monetary stability. The trade-off between ﬁnancial
stability and monetary stability seemed to be more apparent than real. In the long run,
the two goals were likely to be complementary.
B. General Discussions
Following statements by panelists, Ueda moved on to a general discussion with ﬂoor
participants, raising several questions himself. His questions addressed several issues:
the effectiveness of quantitative easing and credit easing and their transmission chan-
nels; the differences between the BOJ’s quantitative easing policy from 2001 to 2006
and those currently undertaken by major central banks, particularly levels of overnight
interest rates and the role of policy commitment; the targets of credit easing; and exit
strategies from unconventional policies.
Regarding differences between quantitative easing and credit easing, Spencer in-
quired about the primary objective of these two policies and the extent to which that
objective had been achieved. Tucker replied that the BOE had implemented quantita-
tive easing to stimulate nominal demand by expanding broad money and so potentially
reducing risk premiums in the ﬁnancial markets through the portfolio rebalancing chan-
nel. Nakaso responded that the BOJ had stepped into credit easing due to signiﬁcant
deterioration in functions of corporate ﬁnancing markets. He argued that declining re-
liance on the BOJ’s credit facilities pointed to a positive signal, since the facilities were
designed to be attractive only in times of crisis, adding that the BOJ had implemented
credit easing within its risk-taking capacity.
Regarding policy commitments, Murray stated that, consistent with their projec-
tions, the BOC had recently committed to maintaining its target overnight rate at 25
basis points for a full year. Positive response to such commitment had been observed
in the yield curve, he added. Nessén remarked that Sveriges Riksbank had disclosed
interest rate forecasts seeking to manage market expectations. Admitting the difﬁculty
of such expectations management, she stated that ﬁnancial markets were contemplat-
ing narrower fan charts of interest rate projections and money market operations with
a ﬁxed interest rate and at longer-term maturities. Smets noted that lengthening the
maturity of money market operations, as the ECB had done, could be used to ﬂatten the
11yield curve. In response, Tucker remarked that conducting money market operations
at longer-term maturities at a ﬁxed rate might leave people, and even policymakers,
unclear about their plans, and that such subtle signals were unlikely to be helpful for
these reasons. Kohn commented that the public had not understood the conditionality
inherentinthelowinterestratepolicyadoptedbytheFedfrom2003to2005.Undercur-
rent circumstances and high associated uncertainties, Nakaso remarked, an improved
communication strategy might prove more important.
Regarding the exit strategy, Altig raised the question as to what would be an ap-
propriate strategy under large budget deﬁcits, which could undermine the credibility
of monetary policy. Kohn and Tucker emphasized the importance of focusing on the
ultimate objective of monetary policy in deciding when to raise interest rates in the exit
process. Kohn spoke to the need to consider the possibility that uncertainty about the
future path of ﬁscal policy and its sustainability would raise risk premiums. Nakaso
noted that credit instruments and bonds currently on the asset side of these central bank
balance sheets had longer maturities than the BOJ’s experience with the quantitative
easing policy. The BOJ, he remarked, had reduced current account balances smoothly
in three months by running off money market operations that had had relatively short
and diversiﬁed maturities.
Shirakawa raised questions as to how a central bank should respond to ﬁnancial
imbalances over longer time horizons than conventional models could cover, and how
a central bank should explain such policy actions to the public. Suarez expressed
concerns that the objective of macroprudential policy might conﬂict with the primary
objective of price stability. Smets suggested that moral hazard issues, such as too-big-
to-fail, and orderly resolution schemes of insolvent banks called for more attention
following the recent crisis. Kent suggested that regulatory policies alone might not
be sufﬁcient given the important role of the unregulated shadow banking system. In
response, Caruana remarked that policymakers needed to make use not just of pru-
dential regulation, but all available tools to stave off a ﬁnancial crisis. He also pointed
out that better consolidation of the banking system would prove vital in discussing
shadow banking system issues. Tucker agreed with the importance of addressing the
too-big-to-fail issue, adding to this the need to develop new instruments for macro-
prudential policy. Kohn maintained that his cost-beneﬁt calculus of leaning-against-
the-wind remained costly, and noted that such a calculus would be complicated on a
real-time basis.
Obstfeld inquired about the implications of Caruana’s description of the Spanish
prudential policy on the design of regulatory structure in currency areas like the euro
area, arguing that the success of the Spanish policy depended on ﬁnancial segmentation
between the Spanish economy and the rest of the euro area. Caruana voiced his agree-
ment, stating that the effects of prudential policy in one country were limited, since
private banks faced competition with foreign private banks. He therefore urged each
country to seek to coordinate with common standards.
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